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Abstract 
We analyse the influence of the recent wave of migration on the incidence of poverty 
among stayers in Ecuador. We draw our data from a survey that provides detailed 
information on migrants. The analysis reveals a significant negative effect of 
migration on poverty among migrant households. This effect is substantially smaller 
than the one that we find focusing on recipient households. We explore the factors 
that account for this divergence. Our analysis entails that the existing empirical 
evidence on the relationship between remittances and poverty needs not to be 
informative about the size of the direct poverty-reduction potential of migration. 
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1 Introduction
What is the influence exerted by international migration on the poverty status of the house-
hold members left behind? Providing an answer to this question requires comparing the
observed incidence of poverty for migrant households1 with the one prevailing in a counter-
factual scenario where all household members stay at home. The economic literature has
been mostly focusing on a related but distinct research question, namely the analysis of the
relationship between the receipt of migrants’ remittances and the incidence of poverty among
stayers (Gustafsson and Makonnen, 1993; Leliveld, 1997; Acosta et al., 2006, 2008; Yang and
Martinez, 2007; Lokshin et al., 2010; Adams and Cuecuecha, 2013).2 Still, the “growing view
in the literature that remittances can have a positive impact on economic development by
reducing poverty” (Adams and Cuecuecha, 2013, p. 38) needs not to be informative about
the size of the direct poverty-reduction potential of international migration. This is due to
the analytical choice of some of the papers in the literature to analyse the effects of remit-
tances while taking migration decisions as given, and to the non coincidence of the group of
migrant and of recipient households.
Specifically, Gustafsson and Makonnen (1993), Leliveld (1997) and Adams and Cue-
cuecha (2013) compare the observed incidence of poverty among recipient households with
the incidence that would have prevailed in a hypothetical scenario with no remittances but
with an unchanged household composition. Other papers analyse a no remittances and no
migration counterfactual, and the choice to focus on the relationship between the receipt of
remittances and the incidence of poverty among stayers appears to be data-driven as the
data either do not allow to identify migrant households (Acosta et al., 2006, 2008) or they
just provide information on the migrants that send remittances (Lokshin et al., 2010). The
econometric evidence provided by these papers is informative about the poverty-reduction
potential of international migration only if the receipt of remittances represents a good proxy
for the unknown migration status of the household, but there are theoretical and empirical
reasons why this is unlikely to be the case.
From a theoretical perspective, the so-called new economics of labor migration portrays
migration as a joint decision of the migrant and of some group of stayers, where remittances
ensure that the monetary returns from migration are shared with the non-migrants that
contributed to finance the cost of the move. This group can extend beyond the household
of origin of the migrant, so that some recipient households are not migrant households.
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Similarly, not all migrant households are also recipient households,3 as the migrant might be
unable or unwilling to abide to the “implicit contractual arrangement” she had agreed upon
with the stayers (Stark and Bloom, 1985). For instance, migrants could experience spells
of unemployment that prevent them from sending remittances, or they might deliberately
decide not to transfer any money back home. The partial, and possibly limited, overlap
between the groups of recipient and migrant households suggests to be wary of interpreting
the available empirical evidence in the literature as being informative about the direct effect
of international migration on poverty at origin. This effect depends on (i) the change in
total household income from domestic sources due to migration, (ii) the variation in the
number of household members residing at origin due to migration, and (iii) the remittances
sent back by the migrants.
Our paper analyses the effect of migration upon the incidence of income poverty among
stayers in Ecuador, a country that experienced an unprecedented wave of international mi-
gration induced by a severe economic crisis at the end of the 1990s. The poverty headcount
rose by an estimated 2 million people between the mid- and the late-1990s (Parandekar et
al., 2002) in a country with a population of 12.7 million. More than half a million Ecuadori-
ans left the country within a few years’ time, mostly heading toward Spain and the US. The
sorting of Ecuadorian migrants across destination and their pattern of selection on education
were shaped by the combined effect of the crisis-induced liquidity constraints and of the high
migration costs that Ecuadorian would-be migrants faced, which were partly policy-induced
(Bertoli et al., 2011). Specifically, most of the recent migrants opted for Spain, where they
enjoyed substantially lower income gains than in the US but where a bilateral visa waiver that
had been granted since 1963 reduced the monetary costs of migration (Bertoli et al., 2013).
Survey data collected in Spain reveal that the cost of migrating from Ecuador amounted on
average to $1,800 (Bertoli et al., 2011); although this figure stands substantially below the
estimated $7,000-$9,000 of attempting to migrate illegally to the US (Jokisch and Pribilsky,
2002), it still hindered both the participation of poor households to this migration wave and
its ensuing influence on poverty at origin.
We draw the data for our analysis from the the Encuesta Nacional de Empleo, Desem-
pleo y Subempleo, ENEMDU, conducted by the INEC in December 2005. This labor market
survey allows us to derive income-based definitions of poverty and it provides detailed in-
formation on migrant members, including the year of migration, age, gender, education and
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the amount of remittances sent over the previous 12 months. The availability of rich data on
migrants represents a key value added of this survey, as our analysis exploits the informa-
tion on the timing of the various migration episodes and the information on the individual
characteristics of the migrants.
Specifically, the ability to identify migrant and not just recipient households allows us
to directly analyse the relationship between international migration and poverty, and to
compare our results with the ones that we obtain when we follow the more standard approach
in the literature, which relies on the receipt of remittances as a proxy for the unobserved
migration status of the household.4 Furthermore, the information on the timing of the
migration episodes allows us to define the treatment of interest as having sent at least one
member abroad after 1998, the year that marks the start of the Ecuadorian crisis (Beckerman
and Corte´s-Douglas, 2002; Ja´come, 2004). This allows us to greatly reduce the heterogeneity
of the influence on poverty that would arise if the group of treated households was based
on migration episodes that are more distant in time, and it also reduces the strength of
the effects of migration on the supply (Mishra, 2007) or on the demand side (Woodruff and
Zenteno, 2007; Wahba and Zenou, 2012; Marchetta, 2012) of the labor market at origin that
can indirectly influence non-migrants.
We resort to propensity score matching, PSM, to identify the effect of migration on
poverty, as we lack a credible instrument for migration, and as this estimation technique
does not require to introduce assumptions on the functional form of the relationship between
household characteristics, migration and poverty. This estimation approach has been recently
applied to the analysis of the effects of migration and remittances by, inter alia, Cox-Edwards
and Rodr´ıguez-Oreggia (2009), Acosta (2011) and Jimenez-Soto and Brown (2012), although
we acknowledge that the debate around its ability to produce unbiased estimates is still
open (Dehejia, 2005; Smith and Todd, 2005a,b; Peikes et al., 2008). This is why we test the
sensitivity of our estimates to possible departures from the identifying assumption following
Rosenbaum (2002) and Becker and Caliendo (2007).
Our empirical analysis reveals that the recent Ecuadorian migration reduced the incidence
of poverty among migrant households by an estimated 17.4-20.8 percent. This effect is
statistically significant, although sensitive to possible violations of the identifying assumption
of selection on observables.
The ENEMDU 2005 survey also allows us to identify recipient households independently
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from the questions related to migrants, as the income section of the questionnaire provides
information related to the receipt of remittances from abroad over the month before the
survey. When, as the literature does, we focus on recipient households, we find sharply
different results, as the treatment is estimated to induce a decline in poverty by 57.2-59.2
percent. These estimates, which are in line with those obtained by Acosta et al. (2008)
with data drawn from the 2004 round of the ENEMDU, entail that the poverty-reduction
potential of international migration cannot, in the case of Ecuador, be inferred from the
existing econometric evidence on the relationship between the receipt of remittances and
poverty, and our paper explores the factors that can account for such a divergence in the
results.
This paper is closely related to four different strands of literature. First, it draws on
the papers that analyse the impact of migration and remittances on poverty at origin with
household-level data (Yang and Martinez, 2007; Acosta et al., 2006, 2008; Lokshin et al.,
2010; de la Fuente, 2010; Jimenez-Soto and Brown, 2012; Adams and Cuecuecha, 2013)
and that estimate counterfactual domestic earnings for the migrants (Adams, 1989; Barham
and Boucher, 1998). Second, it is related to the papers that analyse the determinants of
migrants’ selection (Chiquiar and Hanson, 2005; McKenzie and Rapoport, 2010; Ferna´ndez-
Huertas Moraga, 2011, 2013). Third, it is connected to the vast literature on PSM originating
from the seminal contribution by Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983), and in particular to the
papers that deal with the use of sampling weights (Fro¨lich, 2007; Zanutto, 2006) and with
departures from the identifying assumptions (Becker and Caliendo, 2007; Ichino et al., 2008;
Nannicini, 2007). Fourth, this paper contributes to the strand of literature analyzing the
determinants and the effects of the recent wave of Ecuadorian migration (Beckerman and
Corte´s-Douglas, 2002; Jokisch and Pribilsky, 2002; Ja´come, 2004; Gray, 2009; Calero et al.,
2009; Bertoli, 2010; Bertoli et al., 2011, 2013).
The rest of the paper is structured as follows: Section 2 briefly describes the PSM tech-
nique, and Section 3 discusses its implementation to the analysis of the effect of migration
on poverty. The data source and the descriptive statistics are presented in Section 4. Section
5 presents the estimates and it explores the difference between the results obtained when
focusing on migrant or on recipient households, and Section 6 concludes.
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2 Propensity score matching
Households can be either subject to a treatment, zi = 1, or not, zi = 0, with T (U) denoting
the subsample of treated (untreated) units. Let yi1 be the value of the outcome variable
when zi = 1, and let yi0 represent its value when zi = 0. The observed value of the outcome
variable yi is related to its potential outcomes by the observation rule:
yi = ziyi1 + (1− zi)yi0
The treatment effect on the unit i is defined as τi = yi1 − yi0. The average treatment
effect on the treated, ATET, is defined as:
ET (τi|zi = 1) = ET (yi1|zi = 1)− ET (yi0|zi = 1) (1)
where ET denotes the average on treated units only. The observational rule for yi pre-
cludes the estimation of the ATET, as yi0 is not observed when zi = 1. In a experimental
setting, we have that EU(yi0|zi = 0) = ET (yi0|zi = 1), so that observed outcomes for the
untreated units can substitute for the unobserved outcomes y0 for treated units. With non-
experimental data, this does not hold true because the assignment to the treatment can be
influenced by a vector x of covariates that also exert an influence on y.
Assume that the vector x includes all covariates that have a simultaneous influence on
the treatment and on the outcome, so that the potential outcome y0 is independent from z
conditional upon x. Formally:
y0 ⊥⊥ z|x (2)
where the symbol ⊥⊥ denotes statistical independence. Let f(x) represent the probability
of assignment to treatment, which is also called the propensity score. The seminal contribu-
tion by Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983) demonstrates that if f(x) ∈ (0, 1] and (2) holds, then
we also have that:
y0 ⊥⊥ z|f(x) (3)
The outcome y0 is independent from the assignment to treatment z conditional upon
f(x), as f(x) represents a balancing score that ensures that x ⊥⊥ z|f(x) (Rosenbaum and
Rubin, 1983). This, in turn, implies that the expected value of the unobserved outcome y0
for treated units conditional upon f(x) coincides with the expected value of the observed
outcome y0 for untreated units:
ET [yi0|zi = 1, f(x) = p] = EU [yi0|zi = 0, f(x) = p]
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Hence, the ATET can be estimated through an iterative averaging procedure:
ÊT (τi|zi = 1) =
∫ 1
0
[
ET (yi1|zi = 1, f(x) = p)− EU(yi0|zi = 0, f(x) = p)
]
g(p)dp (4)
where g(p) denotes the distribution of the propensity score over the subsample T .
3 Implementation
We discuss here the key steps of the implementation of PSM to the analysis of the effect of
migration on poverty for Ecuadorian households.5 The treatment zi is represented by having
a household member who migrated, while the outcome yi is given by the income poverty
status.
3.1 Selection of the covariates
The first step is related to the identification of the variables that belong to x, as this vector
has to include only variables that have a simultaneous influence on the probability to have
a migrant member and upon the poverty status of the household. Variables that only have
an impact on the probability to migrate should not be included, as the objective of the
estimation of the propensity score is not to maximize the fit of the model (Caliendo and
Kopeinig, 2008). The inclusion in x of variables that influence exclusively the treatment
would actually reduce the ability of the estimated propensity score to serve as a balancing
score.
The effect of migration on poverty is identified under the assumption that, conditional
upon x, the decision to migrate is not systematically related to the poverty status of Ecuado-
rian households. As this is a strong identifying assumption, we discuss in Section 3.6 how
to assess the sensitivity of our estimates to violations from the assumption of selection on
observables.
3.1.1 Post-treatment measurement of the covariates
Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983) write that the analysis should be based only on variables that
are measured before the treatment so to avoid any endogeneity with respect to the exposure
to the treatment itself, but Lechner (2008) demonstrates that this requirement can actually
be relaxed, specifying the conditions under which the reliance on post-treatment covariates
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does not bias the estimate of the ATET. Specifically, the influence of the treatment on the
covariates should be non-systematic, so that observing them after the treatment only induces
a measurement error in x. If the distribution of the elements of x depends on the exposure
to the treatment, then the estimate of the ATET will be biased.
This is why the availability of data on all household members, irrespective of whether
they migrated or not, is crucial for the analysis: if migrants are not randomly selected
within the household with respect to their gender, age and education, then any measure of
the demographic structure or of the average level of education of the household would be
endogenous to migration,6 precluding its inclusion in the analysis.7 Any demographic event
other than migration, could also drive a wedge between the household characteristics mea-
sured before or after our reference period. A sensitivity of parental decisions on fertility and
education with respect to the prospect to migrate (Mountford and Rapoport, 2011; Docquier
and Rapoport, 2012), to actual migration (Yang, 2008) or to the transfer of norms between
countries (Beine et al., 2013; Bertoli and Marchetta, 2013) could introduce a systematic cor-
relation between the treatment and post-treatment measures of the demographic structure
of the household and of the average level of education of its members.
The empirical relevance of these concerns can be mitigated by focusing on a recent, and
mostly unanticipated, treatment and by measuring household education only on adult mem-
bers, whose education decisions should have not been affected by the receipt of remittances.
No Ecuadorian province with the exception of Azuay and Can˜ar,8 representing just 6 per-
cent of the Ecuadorian population, had a long-standing tradition of migration, which would
greatly magnify the relevance of the concerns about the systematic influence of the treat-
ment on education and demographic variables.9 This is why we are confident that we can
safely draw on Lechner (2008) to justify the inclusion of some post-treatment measures in
the analysis.
While the literature often includes variables that relate to the household head,10 we
chose not to do so as household headship can be endogenous to migration, as observed
by Cox-Edwards and Rodr´ıguez-Oreggia (2009), and the ENEMDU 2005 does not provide
information that could be used to identify the household head in the counterfactual no
migration scenario. The Encuesta de Condiciones de Vida conducted by the INEC in 2006
reveals that 20.8 percent of the migrants were household heads. For similar reasons, we also
opted for omitting measures of asset holdings from x, as Bertoli (2010) provides evidence of
8
their endogeneity with respect to the time elapsed since migration.11
3.2 Estimation of the propensity score
The propensity score f(x) is not known, and it is estimated through a logit model, so that
the probability of assignment to the treatment is estimated as:
f(x) =
ex
′β
1 + ex′β
The coefficients of the estimated propensity score do not have a behavioral interpretation
(Dehejia and Wahba, 2002), so that they should not be regarded as reflecting the effect of the
elements of x upon the probability to have a migrant member. The functional specification
of the estimated propensity score f̂(x) is only meant to ensure that f̂(x) acts as a balancing
score of the covariates, and this can call for the inclusion of higher-order and interaction
terms between the elements of x (Caliendo and Kopeinig, 2008). For the same reason,
sampling weights are not used in the estimation of f̂(x), as this is not meant to support
inferences about the underlying population (Zanutto, 2006; Fro¨lich, 2007).
3.3 Check of the balancing property
The literature offers different approaches to the necessary evaluation of the ability of f̂(x)
to serve as a balancing score. One can perform a t-test on the null hypothesis of the equality
of the mean, conditional on the value of f̂(x), of each of the elements in x in the groups of
treated and untreated units. This approach is exposed to two critiques. First, the balancing
property should be verified not on the whole sample of observations, but on the subsample
that is used to estimate the ATET, so that the ability of f̂(x) to serve as a balancing score
is closely intertwined with the choice of the matching method (Lee, 2013). Second, Imai et
al. (2008) regard the reliance on hypothesis testing as a “balance test fallacy”, as “balance is
a characteristic of the sample, not some hypothetical population, and so, strictly speaking,
hypothesis tests are irrelevant in this context” (Imai et al., 2008, p. 497). The logic that
underlies hypothesis testing is that there is threshold level below which the imbalance of
the covariates can be accepted, while “imbalance with respect to observed pre-treatment
covariates [...] should be minimized without limit where possible” (Imai et al., 2008, p. 497),
and parametric methods could be used to adjust for any residual imbalance (Ho et al., 2007).
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Hence, we follow Sianesi (2004) and re-estimate the propensity score on the matched
sample alone: the difference between the pseudo-R2 on the unmatched and matched sample
gives us a measure of the extent to which the estimated propensity score f̂(x) effectively
balances the covariates. If f̂(x) balances the covariates in the subsample of treated and
control observations, then the logit model should be poorly able to predict assignment to
the treatment when estimated on matched observations only.
Following the arguments by Imai et al. (2008), we also compute the ATET with the
adjustment for the residual imbalance of the covariates x proposed by Abadie et al. (2004)
as discussed in Section 3.5 below.
3.4 Matching methods
The propensity score greatly reduces the “curse of dimensionality” that characterizes match-
ing methods (Caliendo and Kopeinig, 2008), but the exact matching on f̂(x) that would be
required by the estimation of the ATET according to (4) is nevertheless unfeasible, and
we need to resort to approximate matching techniques. Specifically, we rely on n-nearest
neighbor matching, adjusting the matching technique to account for the sampling weights
wi associated to each household in the ENEMDU 2005 following Abadie et al. (2004).
Specifically, let wT represent the average sampling weight of migrant households in the
sample. With n-nearest neighbor matching, with n ≥ 1, each migrant household i is matched
with a set Cn(i) non-migrant households whose estimated propensity score is nearest to f̂(xi),
and whose sum of sampling weights is equal to nwT . Matching is performed only on the
subsample of treated and untreated units that belong to the common support, defined as
the closed subset of the interval [0, 1] where the density of the estimated propensity score
f̂(x) is positive both for migrant and non-migrant households.
3.5 Estimation of the ATET
Sampling weights are not used in the estimation of f(x), as discussed in Section 3.2 above,
while they are used in the estimation of the ATET. This, as described in (4), is the result
of an iterative averaging procedure: following Zanutto (2006) and Fro¨lich (2007), sampling
weights w are used when we compute the counteractual poverty status y0 for each migrant
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household. Specifically, we compute it as:
ŷi0 =
∑
j∈Cn(i)wjyj0∑
j∈Cn(i)wj
Letting T ′ represent the subset of migrant household for which the set of matched control
units is non-empty, the ATET is computed as:
ÊT (τi|zi = 1) =
∑
i∈T ′ wi(yi1 − ŷi0)∑
i∈T ′ wi
(5)
The estimation of the effect of migration on poverty following (5) is the outcome of a two-
step procedure, and the estimation of the standard error of ÊT (τi|zi = 1) should also reflect
the uncertainty that is due to the estimation of the propensity score f̂(x). Abadie and Imbens
(2008) argue that the reliance on bootstrapping to derive the standard error associated to
(5) lacks theoretical justifications, and it can fail to produce an unbiased estimate of the true
standard error. Hence, following their suggestion, we rely on the analytical standard errors
proposed by Abadie and Imbens (2008) and implemented in Stata by Abadie et al. (2004)
to derive correct confidence intervals around our point estimates.
We follow Abadie et al. (2004) also with respect to the estimation of the ATET through
an OLS regression of the observed outcome variable yi on the treatment zi and on the vector
xi on the subsample of matched households in order to correct for the residual imbalance in
the covariates.12
3.6 Sensitivity to departures from selection on observables
The identification of the effect of the treatment z through PSM is based on the assumption of
selection on observables, reflected in (3). The plausibility of this assumption can be defended
on the basis of the relevant theoretical and empirical literature, but it cannot be tested, as
observed data are uninformative about the relationship between the treatment z and the
potential outcome y0. Nevertheless, it is possible to assess the robustness of the estimated
ATET with respect to possible violations of (3), following the approach proposed by Becker
and Caliendo (2007).13
Specifically, Becker and Caliendo (2007) assume that the distribution of a binary outcome
y0 conditional on the propensity score f(x) is not independent from the assignment to
treatment z, while independence would hold conditional on the propensity score estimated
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on x plus an unobserved dichotomous variable u:
y0 ⊥⊥ z|f(x, u) (6)
This implies that the ATET estimated on the basis of matching on f̂(x) does not represent
the true causal effect of the treatment z upon the outcome y for the treated units, as it is
confounded by the non-random selection on the unobservable u of the treated households.
If:
f(x, u) =
ex
′β+γu
1 + ex′β+γu
then, for two households with identical values of the covariates x, we have that the ratio
of their actual odds of exposure to the treatment z belongs to the interval [e−γ, eγ]: only if u
has no impact on f(x, u), i.e., γ = 0, then the two observationally identical households have
the same probability of exposure to z. Becker and Caliendo (2007) rely on the test statistic
proposed by Mantel and Haenszel (1959) to evaluate the effect of u on the significance of
the estimated ATET for different values of eγ, which reflect different assumptions about the
possible impact of u upon the probability of exposure to the treatment.
For instance, if we estimate a negative impact of international migration upon the inci-
dence of poverty, it is interesting to test whether this result might reflect a positive selection
of migrant households on an unobservable characteristic that is positively correlated with
their income generating capacity. The Mantel and Haenszel (1959) test statistic tells us how
strong can be the influence of this unobservable u before we are induced not to reject the null
hypothesis that the effect of international migration upon poverty is actually zero. This test
does not tell us whether such a bias due to an unobservable factor does exist (Becker and
Caliendo, 2007), but only how strong such a possible bias would need to be in order to make
the estimated results sensitive to a departure from the underlying identifying assumption.
4 Data and descriptive statistics
This ENEMDU 2005 survey, which was conducted on a sample of 18,357 households, contains
a module providing information on the household members who had moved abroad and were
absent at the time of the survey. The data on migrants include age, gender, level of education,
year of migration and country of destination; this allows us to identify all Ecuadorians who
left after the late 1990s economic crisis, provided that at least one household member was
still in Ecuador at the time of the survey.
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Whole household migration leads to an undercount of recent Ecuadorian migrants, which
does not represent a reason for concern given that, as the literature does, we are interested in
identifying the effects of migration on the incidence of poverty among stayers. Furthermore,
interviewees might have been reluctant to disclose information on migrant members; reas-
suringly, Bertoli (2010) demonstrates that the observable characteristics of the Ecuadorian
migrants obtained from the ENEMDU 2005 do not differ from those that can be obtained
from US or Spanish sources, so that the undercount of the migrants does not pose a threat
to identification.
We restrict the sample to households that (i) do not have any returnee or foreign-born
among their members, and that (ii) do not have a migrant who left before our period
of analysis (1998-2005). This ensures that our sample includes only households with no
migration experience before the late 1990s economic crisis. We further restrict the sample
to (iii) non migrant households who report not to have received remittances in the month
before the survey,14 and we exclude from the sample households with missing or outlying
data on income.
The ENEMDU 2005 provides information on labor and non-labor earnings, including
public and private transfers. The questionnaire contains two distinct questions with respect
to remittances: first, all households are asked whether they received remittances from abroad,
and the reported amount refers to the same recall period as for all other income sources,
namely the month before the survey. Second, the households that report having at least
one migrant member are asked about the amount of remittances received from each migrant
over the previous 12 months, and about the number of transfers over which this amount was
distributed.
Total income for migrant households is defined as the sum of all incomes from domestic
sources reported for November 2005 plus the average monthly amount of remittances received
over the year before the survey from the migrants. The survey reveals that the migrants who
send remittances to their households in Ecuador realize, on average, seven transfers per year,
and this implies that the remittances received in the month before the survey overstate what
households receive on average, as the high and regressive transfer costs induce migrants to
concentrate their remittances in a limited number of transfers.
Our final sample includes 16,089 households, with 832 households with at least one mi-
gration episode between 1998 and 2005. Table 1 presents the relevant descriptive statistics.
13
Migrant households have on average 1.35 migrants abroad, with 63.4 and 23.1 percent of
them having a migrant in Spain and in the US respectively.
The data reveal that 29.2 percent of the migrant households did not receive remittances
in the 12 months before the survey. We defined the subsample of migrant households as
including all households that sent at least one migrant abroad between 1998 and 2005, and
this implies that some migration episodes actually occurred close to the time of the survey.
If we exclude the households who sent their first member abroad in the two years before the
survey, the share of non recipient still stands at 26.0 percent.
The incidence of income poverty, defined on the basis of the poverty line set by the
INEC,15 stands at 20.9 percent for migrant households; this figure is substantially below
the 36.1 percent that we obtain when defining poverty on the basis of non-remittance in-
come only.16 Still, remittances do not represent a revenue that adds up to other exogenous
income sources, and they at least partly compensate for the foregone domestic earnings
of the migrants,17 and the labor supply decisions of stayers can be endogenous with re-
spect to migration (Chami et al., 2005; Amuedo-Dorantes and Pozo, 2006; Cox-Edwards and
Rodr´ıguez-Oreggia, 2009; Binzel and Assaad, 2011). This suggests regarding the incidence
of poverty among non migrant households to get a first sense of the impact of migration on
poverty. This, as reported in Table 1, stands at 32.2 percent; this implies that the share
of poor households is 35.1 percent lower among migrant than among non migrant house-
holds. The descriptive statistics reveal that the two groups of households differ with respect
to relevant observable characteristics that are likely to be associated both on their poverty
status and on the probability to have a migrant. Specifically, a smaller share of the house-
holds with at least one member who migrated between 1998 and 2005 reside in rural areas,
they have a larger household size and a smaller dependency ratio, and their members are
better educated. Migrant households have working age members with 9.6 years of school-
ing, while the corresponding figure for non migrant households stands at 8.4 years, in line
with the econometric evidence on the determinants of individual self-selection into migration
provided by Bertoli (2010) and Bertoli et al. (2011, 2013). Unsurprisingly, the households
who recently sent one of their members out of Ecuador have also a better connection with
migration networks, proxied by the share of households in each county with a migrant to the
US before 1998.
The variables related to the demographic and schooling characteristics for migrant house-
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holds can be defined either on the basis of all household members, as we did in Table 1, or
on the basis of resident members alone. Table 2 reveals that the exclusion of the data on
migrant members blurs most of the differences in observables between the two groups of
households; beyond the mechanical impact on household size and on the number of working
age members, Table 2 shows that migrants are positively selected on education within the
household, as the average number of years of schooling falls from 9.6 to 8.7 when we ex-
clude migrant members, and the share of households with at least one college graduate falls
from 25.02 to 12.95 percent, with the latter figure coinciding with the one for non-migrant
households reported in Table 1. This reinforces the empirical relevance of the need to have
information on the individual characteristics of migrants, and it gives us a picture of Ecuado-
rian migrants that differs from the one assumed by Acosta et al. (2008). This, in turn, has
relevant implications for the econometric analysis, as the number and level of education of
the migrants clearly exerts an influence upon the poverty status of migrant households in
the counterfactual scenario with no migration.
5 Estimates
5.1 Migration and poverty
The treatment z is represented by having at least one household member who left Ecuador
between 1998 and 2005, and the outcome y is represented by the poverty status of the
household, defined on the basis of the national poverty line.18 We retain the following
household characteristics in the vector x of covariates that is used to estimate the propensity
score f(x): the number of working age members, the dependency ratio, the share of female
working age members, the average years of schooling, a dummy indicating if a household
member completed tertiary education, a dummy signaling indigenous self-identification, the
county-level size of migration networks,19 a dummy for residence in rural areas.20
The choice of the elements of x, which is constrained by the reasons exposed in Section
3.1.1, is driven by the evidence that emerges from the economic literature. Specifically, the
inclusion of variables related to the level of education of the household is motivated by the
evidence of large returns to schooling on the Ecuadorian labor market (Bertoli et al., 2011)
and of the positive selection on education of recent migrants (Bertoli, 2010). The number and
the gender composition of working age members can influence both the probability to send
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one its members abroad (Acosta et al., 2007), and it can also be directly related to household
income per capita, as the labor productivity in family-run activities is not constant–and
labor supply decisions of the household members are mutually interdependent, and Ecuador
is characterized by a large gender gap in wages (see, for instance, Bertoli et al., 2013).
Geographical factors can shape both the opportunity to migrate and the local incidence
of poverty, which is highest in rural areas (Hentschel et al., 2000). Similarly, indigenous
households could be, for linguistic and cultural reasons, less likely to migrate, and are also
exposed to a higher incidence of poverty (Parandekar et al., 2002).21
The overall goodness of fit, measured by the pseudo-R2, of the logit model stands at
0.124, and specification (1) in Table 3 reports the coefficients that are used to generate the
propensity score.22 The estimated propensity score f̂(x) is then used to define the subsample
of non-migrant households that form the control group, and to estimate the ATET. Table
4 reports the results obtained with nearest neighbor matching, with a number of matches
n = 1, ..., 10. The estimation of f̂(x) on the subsample of matched households only is
characterized by a pseudo-R2 that is 89.8 to 98.3 percent lower than on the whole sample.
The reduction in the pseudo-R2 is increasing in the number of matches n, and it already
stands at 96.3 percent when n = 3, and this is reassuring with respect to the ability of f̂(x)
to act as a balancing score.
Table 4 reports the estimated ATET: for n ≥ 3, migration induces a decline in the
incidence of income poverty between 2.8 and 3.7 percentage points, a figure that stands
substantially below the 11.1 percentage points difference reported in Table 1. This suggests
that differences in observables, which are controlled for through the matching procedure,
account for a large part of the lower incidence of poverty among the households who sent
at least one of their member abroad after 1998. Furthermore, the null hypothesis that the
ATET is equal to zero can be marginally rejected only for n ≥ 6.
The estimated ATET increases by 1.3-1.6 percentage points for n ≥ 3 when we adopt
the regression-based approach proposed by Abadie et al. (2004): the estimates for the bias-
adjusted ATET range between -4.4 and -5.5 percentage points, and the null hypothesis that
the true effect is zero can always be rejected at least at the 5 percent confidence level. The
upper bound of this range implies that migration induced a reduction in the incidence of
poverty by 20.8 percent among migrant households. These estimates suggest that differences
in observable characteristics can explain no less than half of the observed difference in the
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incidence of poverty between migrant and non-migrant households.23
What about possible differences in unobservable characteristics? Table 4 reports the
results from the Mantel and Haenszel (1959) test statistic; specifically, it reports the highest
values of eγ that still allow to reject at the 5 or 10 percent confidence level the null hypothesis
that the effect of the treatment is zero, with the estimated effect on poverty actually reflecting
only a positive selection on unobservables. For n ≥ 3, the estimated ATET is still negative
and significant at the 5 percent confidence level for values of eγ ranging between 1.15 and
1.25. This, in turn, implies that an unobserved variable that drives a wedge of 30 percent
in the probability to select into migration for otherwise observationally identical households
would suffice to fully account for the estimated effect of migration on poverty.
While the test proposed by Becker and Caliendo (2007) is silent about the existence of
such a variable, as the conditional independence assumption in (3) is untestable, it suggests
that the estimated effect of migration on poverty in Ecuador might reflect even a moderate
extent of positive selection on unobservables. The exclusion from the vector x of covariates
of any measure of household assets, which is due to the endogeneity of the asset holdings
observed at the time of the survey (Bertoli, 2010) and to the absence of retrospective in-
formation, implies that concerns about a possible non-random selection on unobservables
cannot be readily dismissed. This, in turn, suggests that the ability of the recent wave of
migration to reduce the incidence of income poverty in Ecuador might have been limited.
5.2 Remittances and poverty
The survey also allows us to define the treatment as the receipt of remittances. As discussed
in Section 4, all households in the sample are asked whether they received remittances
from abroad in the month before the survey, as in Acosta et al. (2006, 2008), irrespective
of whether they report to have a migrant member.24 We can then define the income of
recipient households as the sum of incomes from all sources, including remittances, reported
for November 2005.
No information is provided on the characteristics of the sender of remittances; we in-
troduce the same hypotheses as Rodriguez (1998) and Acosta et al. (2008), namely that
remittances are sent by one male adult, with the same level of education as non-migrant
adults. The incidence of poverty among recipient households stands at 12.8 percent, signif-
icantly below the 20.9 percent that characterizes migrant households and 19.2 percentage
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points below the corresponding figure for non recipient households.
Specification (2) in Table 3 reports the estimated propensity score f̂(x), and Table 5
reports the estimated ATET. With respect to f̂(x), we can observe the change in the esti-
mated coefficients for the two variables that describe the level of education of the households:
the dummy for college education is negative and highly statistically significant, while the
average number of years of schooling is no longer significant.25 These changes can be related
to the fact that the hypotheses that we introduced about the migrants are at odds with
the observed positive selection on education within the household, evidenced by Table 2.
Clearly, these changes in f̂(x) have an impact on the composition of the control group, and
on the estimated ATET.
This becomes apparent from Table 5, where the receipt of remittances is estimated to
reduce the share of poor households among recipients between 17.1 and 18.6 percentage
points with the bias-adjusted specification of the ATET. These figures correspond to a 57.2-
59.2 percent fall in the incidence of poverty,26 well above the 20.8 percent decline that
represented the highest estimated effect obtained when migration represents the treatment
variable of interest.
The Mantel and Haenszel (1959) bounds reveal that an unobserved factor that could dou-
ble the relative probability of selection into treatment for observationally identical households
would not suffice to explain the estimated effect of remittances on poverty. Hence, Table
5 suggests that remittances have a large and highly significant effect on poverty, which is
seemingly more robust than the effects reported in Table 4 to a possible non-random selec-
tion on unobservables. Nevertheless, the larger values of the Mantel and Haenszel (1959)
bounds are due to the reliance on a shorter recall period for remittances, as discussed below
in Section 5.3.2, and the likelihood of a positive selection on unobservables substantially
increases because of the introduction of hypotheses on the characteristics of the migrants.
5.3 Exploring the difference in the estimates
What can explain the contrast between these estimates, which could provide support to
an optimistic view on the poverty-reduction potential of the recent wave of Ecuadorian
migration, and the significantly lower effect that we obtained when focusing on migrant
households? There are three main factors that can account for this difference,27 namely (i)
the substantial share of migrant households that do not receive remittances, (ii) the different
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recall periods, and (iii) the introduction of hypotheses on the unreported characteristics of
the migrants.
5.3.1 Non-recipient migrant households
As discussed in Section 4, nearly 30 percent of migrant households do not report to have
received any transfer from their migrants in the 12 months before the survey. When the
treatment is defined as the receipt of remittances, non recipient migrant households are
excluded from the group of treated households and this can, in turn, magnify the size of
the estimated ATET. We follow two different approaches, which reduce the share of non
recipient in the treated group, to gauge the relevance of the difference in the definition of
the treatment in accounting for the differences in the ATET reported in Tables 4 and 5.
First, we re-define the treatment z as having at least a member who migrated between
1998 and 2005 and receiving remittances over the longer 12-month recall period, and this
reduces the number of treated households to 587.28 The estimation of the propensity score is
based on the reported individual characteristics of the migrants, as signaled in the third data
column in Table 3. The estimated coefficients for the covariates are closer to those obtained
in our benchmark specification, with education increasing the probability of exposure to
the treatment. Table 6 reports the ATET: migration and the receipt of remittances reduce
the incidence of poverty among treated households between 6.4 and 9.5 percentage points,
which correspond to a decline in the poverty headcount ratio between 23.4 and 31.3 percent.
The estimated effects are more robust to departures from the hypothesis of selection on
observables than those in our preferred specification in Table 4.
Second, we defined z as having at least one migrant member who migrated between
1998 and 2003, and we drop from the sample the households with their first migration
episode in the two years before the survey where the share of non recipient stands at 54.4
percent.29 The fourth data column in Table 3 reports the results of the estimation of f̂(x)
on this restricted sample, and Table 7 presents the ensuing estimates of the ATET. The
bias-adjusted estimated ATET ranges between -5.4 and -7.8 percentage points when n ≥ 3,
suggesting that the migration episodes that occurred between 1998 and 2003 reduce the
incidence of poverty among migrant households between 20.3 and 26.9 percent, an effect
that is larger than in our benchmark specification. This larger effect is consistent with the
expectation that, at least initially, the time elapsed since migration increases the likelihood
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that the migrant sends remittances back home.
The non-negligible share of migrant households that do not receive remittances over the
12-month recall period thus contributes to explain the different reduction in the incidence of
poverty that we find when we define migration or the receipt of remittances as the treatment
of interest, but it falls short of accounting for the whole difference.
5.3.2 Different recall periods for remittances
When we focus on migrant households, the ENEMDU 2005 provides information on the
remittances received over a period of 12 months, while the focus on recipient households
forces us to rely on the amount of remittances reported just for the month before the survey.
The shorter recall period can, as discussed in Section 4, induce an overestimation of the
income from remittances for recipient households, whenever transfers do not occur on a
regular monthly basis.
The average amount of remittances received in November 2005 by recipient households
stands at $261.34, significantly above the average monthly amount of remittances received
by migrant households over the previous 12 months. Migrant recipient households receive
a monthly average amount of remittances equal to $195.80. This implies that the average
amount of remittances measured over the shorter recall period exceeds by 33.5 percent the
average monthly amount measured over the recall period of one year.
The overestimation in total household income for recipient households induces an un-
derestimation in the observed incidence of poverty among recipient households, which Sec-
tion 5.2 signaled to stand at 12.8 percent, well below the corresponding figure for migrant
households. This, in turn, has a direct implication with respect to the estimated ATET,
which depends, as evidenced in (5), linearly on the observed poverty status yi1 of treated
households. Any underestimation of the incidence of poverty among recipient households
leads, one to one, to an overestimation of the ATET, and it also increases the Mantel and
Haenszel (1959) bounds, whose value is a monotonically increasing function of the share of
non-poor treated households (Becker and Caliendo, 2007).
Furthermore, the probability of receiving remittances in the month before the survey
is clearly increasing with the frequency with which households receive transfers from their
migrants; hence, a shorter recall period for remittances leads to the inclusion in the group of
treated of the households that receive a larger number of transfers per year. If the number
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of transfers is positively correlated with their aggregate amount, then the group of treated is
likely to under-represent the recipient households that receive lower amount of remittances,
and this can also induce an upward bias in the estimated effect on poverty.
The empirical relevance of these arguments can be assessed if we define the treatment as
having at least one migrant member between 1998 and 2005 and having received remittances
over the one-month recall period. Such a definition reduces the size of the group of treated
to 377 households, with an incidence of poverty that stands at 7.8 percent. This figure is
13.8 percentage points below the one recorded for recipient households when remittances
are reported over the 12-month recall period, consistently with the underestimation of the
incidence of poverty among recipient households that is induced by the reliance on a shorter
recall period to measure a sporadic transfer.
The fifth data column in Table 3 reports the results of the estimation of f̂(x) under this
definition of the treatment, and Table 8 presents the corresponding ATET. The bias-adjusted
ATET reveals a reduction in the incidence of poverty between 16.0 and 19.6 percentage
points, an effect that is significantly larger than the 6.4-9.5 percentage points reduction
estimated when remittances are measured over the longer 12-month recall period (see Table
6). Furthermore, the estimated effect on poverty appears to be extremely robust to possible
departures from the identifying assumption, as an unobservable factor that influences the
probability of selection into treatment by a factor of four would not suffice to bring the
ATET to zero.
These results entail that the length of the recall period over which remittances are
recorded plays a key role in the explanation of the divergence in the results between our
preferred approach, which focuses on migration, and the one that defines the receipt of
remittances as the treatment of interest.
5.3.3 The hypotheses on the characteristics of the migrants
Household-level data on the receipt of remittances is rarely matched by information on the
individual characteristics of the migrant who transfers resources to recipient households. As
discussed in Section 3.1.1, the lack this information poses a threat to identification, because
some relevant household characteristics become endogenous to migration, and this threat can
be mitigated, but not fully addressed, by the introduction of assumptions on the (unknown)
characteristics of the migrants.
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The availability of individual information on absent members for migrant households
gives us the opportunity of assessing the accuracy of the hypotheses. Table 1 evidences that
migrant households have on average 1.35 migrant members and Table 1 signals that recent
migration flows are gender-balanced, while our estimates in Section 5.2 have been based
on the assumption that each recipient household only had one male migrant. Furthermore,
and possibly more importantly, Table 2 also reveals that migrants are positively selected on
education within each household, and this contrasts with the assumption that migrants have
the same level of education as non-migrant members that we retained from Acosta et al.
(2008).
How does the discrepancy between the observed characteristics of the migrants and the
hypotheses that we adopted influence our estimates? To provide an answer to this question,
we re-estimated the effect of migration on poverty disregarding the reported data on migrants
and introducing the same assumptions as in Acosta et al. (2008). The results are reported
in the sixth data column of Table 3 and in Table 9. The estimated coefficients for the
education variables are in line with those reported in specification (2), as households with
college education have a lower estimated propensity f̂(x) to be exposed to the treatment.
The bias-adjusted estimation of the ATET reported in Table 9 reveal that migration reduces
the incidence of poverty among migrant households between 4.9 and 7.8 percentage points,
with the larger effect corresponding to a 27.2 percent reduction in the poverty headcount
ratio. This is in line with the prediction that a systematic error in the measurement of some
elements of x for threated households determines a bias in the estimated effect on poverty
(Lechner, 2008).
We have provided evidence that points (i)-(iii) above contribute to explain the difference
in the results obtained when focusing on migrant or on recipient households, with the length
of the recall period for remittances being the single most relevant factor. The analytical
choice of relying on the receipt of remittances to define the treatment of interest, which is
often data-driven, produces estimates that are not, in our case, informative about the direct
influence of international migration on poverty.
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6 Concluding remarks
Our analysis reveals that the wave of migration that was triggered by the late-1990s economic
crisis in Ecuador has induced a decline in the incidence of poverty among migrant households,
that is estimated between 17.4 and 20.8 percent and which might also reflect a positive
selection on unobservables. The availability of data on migrants and the measurement of
remittances over a 12-month recall period proved to be critical in our analysis. The standard,
and less data-demanding, choice to focus on the receipt of remittances as the treatment
of interest would have produced a significantly larger estimated effect on poverty. The
substantial share of non recipient migrant households only partly explains the difference
between the two estimates, which is also driven by the shorter recall period for remittances
and by the introduction of hypotheses on the characteristics of migrant members. The high
migration costs that most would-be migrants faced at the end of the 1990s (Bertoli et al.,
2013) probably contributed to limit the direct poverty-reduction potential of the Ecuadorian
exodus, as they hindered poor households from sending one of their members abroad.
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Notes
1The expression “migrant household” is used throughout this paper to denote a household that resides
at origin and that has sent at least one of its members abroad.
2See Adams (2011) for a recent survey of the analytical challenges posed by the use of household-level
data to analyse the effects of remittances on migrant-sending countries.
3The share of households with at least one migrant that do not receive remittances stands, for instance,
at 41 percent for Nicaragua in Barham and Boucher (1998) and at 37 percent for Guyana in Agarwal and
Horowitz (2002).
4Notice that this analysis is not meant to isolate the effect of remittances on poverty, opposed to a distinct
effect of migration.
5Caliendo and Kopeinig (2008) provide an excellent survey of the analytical choices involved in the
implementation of this estimation method.
6The availability of data on migrants allows us to fully account for the migration-induced variation in
household-size, thus avoiding the risk, which is pointed out by Schiff (2008), of underestimating the effect of
migration on poverty.
7An alternative approach to reduce the concerns about endogeneity is to introduce explicit assumptions
about the migrant members, when these are unobserved; for instance, Acosta et al. (2008) follow Rodriguez
(1998), assuming that “remittances are sent by an adult male family member, who has the average years of
education of other adults in the household” (p. 99).
8All the results presented in Section 5 are robust to the exclusion from the sample of the households
residing in these two provinces.
9The limited time elapsed since the treatment also mitigates the concern about the direct and opposite
effects of migration on the number of dependent members in the household, due to the reduction in the
opportunities for sexual intercourse between the migrant and the spouse left behind and to the improved
chances of survival of older members due to a migration-induced increase in consumption.
10See, for instance, Acosta et al. (2006, 2008) and Calero et al. (2009) for analyses on Ecuadorian data.
11Specifically, the asset index, which is built by Bertoli (2010) only on the basis of the assets that are
“more likely to reflect past savings” (Acosta, 2011, p. 919), is an increasing function of the years passed
since migration; this might reflect either the positive effect of remittances or the depletion of household
assets to cover the monetary costs of migration, or both.
12This choice is in line with McKenzie et al. (2010), who observe that “among the other non-experimental
methods, difference in-differences and propensity score matching with bias-adjustment work best” (p. 942)
when estimating the income gains from migration.
13See Caliendo and Kopeinig (2008) for an overview of the alternative approaches to test the sensitivity
of the estimates to the existence of confounders.
14The exclusion of recipient households with no migrants is motivated by the idea that a large share of
these households could be actually mis-reporting with respect to the existence of a migrant, although this
group also certainly includes recipient households belonging to the extended family of the migrants; the
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results of our analysis are unaffected by this sample selection criterion. Notice that the impossibility to
identify with certainty the recipient households that actually have no migrants and the availability for them
of data on remittances only on the shorter one-month recall period hinder any analysis of the effects of
remittances on their poverty status.
15The poverty line was set at $56.60 per month, which corresponds to $3.77 per day at purchasing power
parity terms (World Bank, 2012).
16Early contributions to the literature (Gustafsson and Makonnen, 1993; Leliveld, 1997) relied on the
comparison between these two figures to assess the impact of migration and remittances on poverty.
17If the migrant was the main breadwinner within the household, than the income per capita of the stayers
falls after migration.
18Our results are robust to the adoption of the $2 a day poverty line, in purchasing power parity terms,
and to the reliance on an equivalence scale to define poverty on the basis of income per adult equivalent; the
estimates are available from the authors upon request.
19The estimates presented in this section are robust to defining the treatment on the basis of migration
to Spain only, a choice that greatly limits the concerns about a better within-county connection to mi-
gration networks for treated than for non-treated households, given the limited to non-existent network of
Ecuadorians in Spain before the late 1990s (Bertoli et al., 2011).
20We retain the same specification of the vector of covariates across the six specifications presented in
Table 3, as changes in the set of covariates would blur the interpretation of the differences in the estimated
ATET obtained with different definitions of the treatment z.
21We also include dummies for the 21 Ecuadorian in-land provinces, to control for residual unobservable
factors that can simultaneously influence poverty and migration at the provincial level.
22Adding just the gender of the household head, as in Adams and Cuecuecha (2013), to the vector of 28
covariates suffices to increase the pseudo-R2 by 40 percent, from 0.124 to 0.174. Still, household headship is
endogenous with respect to migration as it is defined only among non-migrant members, and the significantly
higher share of female-headed households among migrant (34.8 percent) than among non-migrant households
(15.9 percent) is likely to have been determined by the migration of the former male household head.
23The treatment is estimated to increase the incidence of poverty between 7.8 and 8.7 percentage points if
we define the poverty status on the basis of earnings from domestic sources only, thus excluding remittances.
24Our estimates are robust to the exclusion of non-migrant recipient households from the sample.
25We can also observe that the dummy variable for residence in rural areas is now negative and significant.
26These figures are close to those obtained for Ecuador by Acosta et al. (2007), which estimate a 51.6 and
52.4 percent decline with a two-stage Heckman procedure when poverty is defined according to the national
extreme poverty and the $2 a day poverty lines respectively, and remittances are measured over a one-month
recall period using a 2004 round of the ENEMDU survey.
27A fourth factor could be represented by the receipt of remittances by non-migrant households; as dis-
cussed in Section 4, we dropped from the sample the households with no migrants that received remittances in
November 2005, and this sample selection criterion deprives this additional factor of any empirical relevance
in our case.
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28We exclude from the sample migrant non-recipient households; the estimates, which are available from
the authors upon request, are robust to their inclusion in the sample.
29The estimates are robust to the exclusion of all migrant households with any migration episode in the
two years before the survey, or in 2005 alone, as all these different sample selection criteria determine an
increase in the ATET; results are available from the authors upon request.
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Table 1: Descriptive statistics
Households
Variables Non migrant Migrant All
Monthly income per capita, $ 123.34 150.91 124.83
(174.56) (159.34) (173.88)
Monthly non-remittance income per capita, $ 123.34 117.75 123.04
(174.56) (148.96) (173.28)
Monthly total remittances, $ 0.00 138.70 7.51
(0.00) (226.02) (61.20)
Poora 32.02 20.89 31.42
(46.66) (40.68) (46.42)
Poor,a non-remittance income 32.02 36.12 32.24
(46.66) (48.06) (46.74)
Migrants 0.00 1.35 0.07
(0.00) (0.79) (0.36)
Resident in rural areasa 35.19 26.28 34.71
(47.76) (44.04) (47.60)
Networka 0.78 1.22 0.80
(1.75) (2.83) (1.83)
Indigenousa 12.76 12.97 12.78
(33.37) (33.62) (33.78)
Household size 5.23 6.71 5.31
(2.40) (2.88) (2.45)
Working age members 3.11 4.41 3.18
(1.61) (1.78) (1.64)
Dependency ratio 0.38 0.31 0.38
(0.24) (0.19) (0.24)
Female share 0.50 0.53 0.50
(0.22) (0.21) (0.22)
Collegea 12.95 25.02 13.60
(33.57) (43.34) (34.28)
Years of schooling 8.37 9.60 8.44
(4.06) (3.31) (4.03)
Observations 15,257 832 16,089
Notes : a percent; standard deviations in parenthesis; sampling weights used to com-
pute all descriptive statistics; networks represents the county-level share of house-
holds with at least one migrant to the US before 1998; the dependency ratio is
computed as the ration between dependent members and household size; years of
schooling measured on working age members; college is a dummy variable signal-
ing whether at least one household member has completed college education; the
poverty line stands at $56.60 per capita.
Source: Authors’ elaboration on ENEMDU 2005.
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Table 2: Characteristics of migrant household, including and excluding migrants
Migrant members
Variables Included Excluded
Household size 6.71 5.35
Working age members 4.41 3.12
Dependency ratio 0.31 0.38
Female share 0.53 0.55
College 25.02 12.95
Years of schooling 9.60 8.74
Observations 832 832
Notes : sampling weights used to compute all
descriptive statistics, obtained either includ-
ing or excluding the data on migrant house-
hold members.
Source: Authors’ elaboration on ENEMDU
2005.
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Table 3: Estimation of the propensity score, logit model
Dependent variable Migrant and Migrant and
Migrant Recipient recipient Migrant recipient Migrant
Recall period (months) 12 1 12 12 1 12
Data on migrants observed hypotheses observed observed observed hypotheses
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Rural areas 0.020 -0.553*** 0.017 0.015 -0.034 -0.398***
(0.090) (0.088) (0.105) (0.095) (0.130) (0.087)
Network 0.064*** 0.057*** 0.076*** 0.067*** 0.081*** 0.064***
(0.013) (0.014) (0.015) (0.014) (0.018) (0.013)
Indigenous -0.232* -0.217* -0.262* -0.280** -0.199 -0.240*
(0.124) (0.127) (0.144) (0.131) (0.177) (0.122)
Working age members 0.453*** 0.396*** 0.477*** 0.459*** 0.468*** 0.430***
(0.023) (0.024) (0.026) (0.024) (0.033) (0.023)
Dependency ratio -0.041 0.336** 0.382* -0.152 0.934*** -0.346**
(0.179) (0.162) (0.213) (0.190) (0.266) (0.159)
Female share 0.216 -2.860*** 0.201 0.176 0.220 -2.651***
(0.168) (0.183) (0.199) (0.178) (0.243) (0.177)
College 0.383*** -0.515*** 0.278** 0.333*** 0.145 -0.282**
(0.116) (0.149) (0.137) (0.123) (0.168) (0.136)
Years of schooling 0.062*** 0.006 0.068*** 0.061*** 0.084*** 0.010
(0.013) (0.012) (0.016) (0.014) (0.019) (0.012)
Provincial dummies yes yes yes yes yes yes
χ2(20) 150.66*** 94.19*** 121.15*** 130.30*** 91.80*** 163.03***
Pseudo-R2 0.1244 0.1015 0.1206 0.1235 0.1095 0.1241
Observations 16,089 16,491 15,844 15,997 15,634 16,089
Notes : standard errors in parenthesis; *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1; χ2(20) test performed
on the null hypothesis that the provincial dummies are jointly equal to zero; in specification (2),
recipient households are identified on the basis of the question contained in the income section of
the questionnaire; specification (3) is based on a sample that excludes migrant households that do
not receive remittances; specification (4) is based on a sample that excludes migrant households with
their first migration episode after 2003; specification (5) is based on a sample that excludes migrant
households that do not receive remittances; hypotheses on migrant members in specifications (2) and
(6) as in Acosta et al. (2008).
Source: Authors’ elaboration on ENEMDU 2005.
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Table 4: The effect on poverty (migrant households)
Non-matched sample
Households
migrant non migrant pseudo-R2 Difference
in poverty
832 15,257 0.1244 -0.111***
(0.022)
Matched samples
Households
n migrant non migrant pseudo-R2 ATET ATET MH bounds
bias-adj. p < 0.05 p < 0.10
1 832 928 0.0127 -0.015 -0.037 1.14 1.18
(0.025) (0.023)
2 832 1,597 0.0066 -0.030 -0.047** 1.12 1.16
(0.024) (0.022)
3 832 2,195 0.0046 -0.028 -0.044** 1.20 1.24
(0.023) (0.021)
4 832 2,732 0.0045 -0.031 -0.046** 1.18 1.22
(0.022) (0.020)
5 832 3,232 0.0044 -0.029 -0.045** 1.20 1.24
(0.022) (0.020)
6 832 3,674 0.0043 -0.037* -0.055*** 1.20 1.24
(0.021) (0.020)
7 832 4,130 0.0034 -0.037* -0.052*** 1.20 1.24
(0.021) (0.019)
8 832 4,544 0.0030 -0.036* -0.050*** 1.22 1.28
(0.021) (0.019)
9 832 4,879 0.0026 -0.035* -0.048** 1.26 1.30
(0.021) (0.019)
10 832 5,195 0.0021 -0.036* -0.050*** 1.28 1.34
(0.020) (0.019)
Notes : standard errors in parenthesis; *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1; the
treatment is defined as having at least one member who migrated between 1998 and
2005; n represents the number of nearest neighbors used in the matching; sampling
weights used for matching; the pseudo-R2 is derived from the re-estimation of the
propensity score on the sample of matched households only; the bias-adjusted ATET
is estimated following Abadie et al. (2004); the last two data columns report the
highest value of eγ for which the Mantel and Haenszel bounds proposed by Becker
and Caliendo (2007) allow to reject the null hypothesis that the ATET is equal to
zero at the 5 and 10 percent confidence level.
Source: Authors’ elaboration on ENEMDU 2005.
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Table 5: The effect on poverty (recipient households, one-month)
Non-matched sample
Households
recipient non recipient pseudo-R2 Difference
in poverty
780 15,711 0.1015 -0.192***
(0.016)
Matched samples
Households
n recipient non recipient pseudo-R2 ATET ATET MH bounds
bias-adj. p < 0.05 p < 0.10
1 780 1,535 0.0167 -0.183*** -0.180*** 2.05 2.15
(0.023) (0.022)
2 780 2,140 0.0123 -0.163*** -0.179*** 2.20 2.30
(0.020) (0.020)
3 780 2,688 0.0110 -0.157*** -0.171*** 2.20 2.30
(0.019) (0.019)
4 780 3,178 0.0087 -0.171*** -0.186*** 2.25 2.35
(0.019) (0.018)
5 780 3,587 0.0075 -0.171*** -0.184*** 2.35 2.45
(0.018) (0.018)
6 780 4,017 0.0063 -0.174*** -0.183*** 2.30 2.40
(0.018) (0.018)
7 780 4,397 0.0059 -0.169*** -0.176*** 2.25 2.35
(0.018) (0.017)
8 780 4,719 0.0057 -0.171*** -0.176*** 2.25 2.35
(0.018) (0.017)
9 780 5,083 0.0049 -0.171*** -0.175*** 2.25 2.35
(0.018) (0.017)
10 780 5,369 0.0044 -0.172*** -0.176*** 2.30 2.40
(0.017) (0.017)
Notes : the treatment is defined as having received remittances from abroad over the
one-month recall period; see also Table 4.
Source: Authors’ elaboration on ENEMDU 2005.
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Table 6: The effect on poverty (migrant and recipient households, 12-month)
Non-matched sample
Households
migrant non migrant pseudo-R2 Difference
in poverty
587 15,257 0.1206 -0.104***
(0.019)
Matched samples
Households
n migrant non migrant pseudo-R2 ATET ATET MH bounds
bias-adj. p < 0.05 p < 0.10
1 587 1,025 0.0082 -0.057** -0.075*** 1.28 1.34
(0.029) (0.027)
2 587 1,446 0.0062 -0.042 -0.064*** 1.22 1.28
(0.026) (0.024)
3 587 1,808 0.0040 -0.045* -0.072*** 1.26 1.32
(0.026) (0.024)
4 587 2,182 0.0027 -0.049* -0.082*** 1.30 1.36
(0.025) (0.023)
5 587 2,537 0.0023 -0.060** -0.095*** 1.34 1.40
(0.025) (0.023)
6 587 2,847 0.0024 -0.048** -0.081*** 1.32 1.38
(0.024) (0.023)
7 587 3,183 0.0019 -0.052** -0.083*** 1.34 1.40
(0.023) (0.022)
8 587 3,411 0.0019 -0.052** -0.081*** 1.36 1.42
(0.023) (0.022)
9 587 3,659 0.0019 -0.051** -0.076*** 1.36 1.42
(0.022) (0.021)
10 587 3,946 0.0015 -0.049** -0.075*** 1.38 1.44
(0.022) (0.021)
Notes : the treatment is defined as having at least one member who migrated between
1998 and 2005 and having received remittances over the 12-month recall period; see
also Table 4.
Source: Authors’ elaboration on ENEMDU 2005.
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Table 7: The effect on poverty (migrant households, 1998-2003)
Non-matched sample
Households
migrant non migrant pseudo-R2 Difference
in poverty
740 15,257 0.1235 -0.109***
(0.017)
Matched samples
Households
n migrant non migrant pseudo-R2 ATET ATET MH bounds
bias-adj. p < 0.05 p < 0.10
1 740 1,362 0.0102 -0.035 -0.020 1.16 1.22
(0.027) (0.024)
2 740 1,908 0.0061 -0.040 -0.042* 1.18 1.22
(0.026) (0.023)
3 740 2,344 0.0033 -0.046* -0.054** 1.20 1.24
(0.025) (0.023)
4 740 2,785 0.0029 -0.050** -0.063*** 1.20 1.26
(0.024) (0.022)
5 740 3,177 0.0026 -0.056** -0.069*** 1.24 1.28
(0.023) (0.022)
6 740 3,552 0.0026 -0.065*** -0.074*** 1.24 1.30
(0.023) (0.021)
7 740 3,904 0.0027 -0.069*** -0.075*** 1.26 1.30
(0.023) (0.021)
8 740 4,256 0.0021 -0.066*** -0.074*** 1.26 1.32
(0.023) (0.021)
9 740 4,573 0.0020 -0.064*** -0.074*** 1.28 1.32
(0.022) (0.020)
10 740 4,913 0.0018 -0.068*** -0.078*** 1.30 1.34
(0.022) (0.020)
Notes : the treatment is defined as having at least one member who migrated between
1998 and 2003; see also Table 4.
Source: Authors’ elaboration on ENEMDU 2005.
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Table 8: The effect on poverty (migrant and recipient households, one-month)
Non-matched sample
Households
migrant non migrant pseudo-R2 Difference
in poverty
377 15,257 0.1095 -0.242***
(0.023)
Matched samples
Households
n migrant non migrant pseudo-R2 ATET ATET MH bounds
bias-adj. p < 0.05 p < 0.10
1 377 659 0.0128 -0.124*** -0.161*** 4.20 4.60
(0.029) (0.027)
2 377 948 0.0087 -0.140*** -0.160*** 4.30 4.70
(0.027) (0.025)
3 377 1,205 0.0049 -0.136*** -0.162*** 4.55 5.00
(0.025) (0.024)
4 377 1,459 0.0039 -0.133*** -0.164*** 4.60 5.05
(0.025) (0.023)
5 377 1,700 0.0039 -0.140*** -0.170*** 4.50 4.90
(0.024) (0.023)
6 377 1,929 0.0044 -0.149*** -0.179*** 4.50 4.90
(0.024) (0.023)
7 377 2,157 0.0040 -0.154*** -0.184*** 4.60 5.05
(0.024) (0.022)
8 377 2,398 0.0035 -0.159*** -0.187*** 4.55 4.95
(0.023) (0.022)
9 377 2,620 0.0035 -0.171*** -0.195*** 4.55 4.95
(0.023) (0.022)
10 377 2,820 0.0033 -0.173*** -0.196*** 4.65 5.05
(0.023) (0.022)
Notes : the treatment is defined as having at least one member who migrated between
1998 and 2005 and having received remittances over the one-month recall period;
see also Table 4.
Source: Authors’ elaboration on ENEMDU 2005.
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Table 9: The effect on poverty (migrant households with hypotheses on migrants)
Non-matched sample
Households
migrant non migrant pseudo-R2 Difference
in poverty
832 15,257 0.1241 -0.111***
(0.022)
Matched samples
Households
n migrant non migrant pseudo-R2 ATET ATET MH bounds
bias-adj. p < 0.05 p < 0.10
1 832 1,469 0.0160 -0.045* -0.049** 1.28 1.34
(0.024) (0.022)
2 832 2,066 0.0102 -0.068*** -0.078*** 1.28 1.34
(0.024) (0.022)
3 832 2,562 0.0069 -0.066*** -0.072*** 1.32 1.36
(0.022) (0.021)
4 832 3,023 0.0057 -0.069*** -0.076** 1.30 1.36
(0.022) (0.020)
5 832 3,456 0.0049 -0.067*** -0.073*** 1.30 1.34
(0.021) (0.020)
6 832 3,858 0.0038 -0.060*** -0.062*** 1.30 1.36
(0.021) (0.019)
7 832 4,212 0.0039 -0.059*** -0.062*** 1.30 1.34
(0.020) (0.019)
8 832 4,568 0.0036 -0.060*** -0.065*** 1.28 1.34
(0.020) (0.019)
9 832 4,895 0.0032 -0.057*** -0.063*** 1.30 1.36
(0.020) (0.019)
10 832 5,239 0.0029 -0.054*** -0.060*** 1.34 1.38
(0.020) (0.018)
Notes : the treatment is defined as having at least one member who migrated between
1998 and 2005; see also Table 4.
Source: Authors’ elaboration on ENEMDU 2005.
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